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ABSTRACT 
This thesis researches three types of information-generated effects that are often 
observed in police operations: 1) anticipatory effects, 2) diffusion effects, and 3) 
residual effects.  These information-generated effects depict the fact that criminal 
activity often decreases before a new police operation starts, decreases outside 
the geographical areas where the police operations are occurring, and regularly 
remains lower for an extended period of time after an operation has concluded.  
These disruptions in criminal activity are thought to occur because of an increase 
in the perceptions of risk and uncertainty in response to information about 
changes in enforcement presence and activities.  
The purpose of this research is to propose that anticipatory effects, 
diffusion effects, and residual effects can be planned into counterinsurgency 
operations to increase their effectiveness.  These effects might be achieved 
through the oscillatory use of information operations that target an insurgent’s 
perceptions of risk and uncertainty about security force operations occurring in 
circumscribed areas. 
  vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................... 2 
B. HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................... 2 
C. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 2 
II. INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS...................................................... 5 
A. INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS ........................................... 5 
B. DEFINING INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS ......................... 6 
1. Anticipatory Effects................................................................. 6 
2. Diffusion Effects ...................................................................... 8 
3. Residual Effects..................................................................... 12 
C. SUMMATION ..................................................................................... 13 
III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ................................................................ 15 
A. HYPOTHESIS .................................................................................... 15 
B. RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE................................................ 15 
C. DECISION INTERDEPENDENCY AMONG POTENTIAL 
CRIMINALS AND INSURGENTS ...................................................... 16 
D. THE PROPORTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY.................................................................................. 17 
E. DECAYING EFFECTS AND DECAYING IMPLEMENTATION ......... 21 
F. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS....................................................... 22 
IV. AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS................ 23 
A. ANTICIPATORY, DIFFUSION, AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS ............. 24 
B. RESEARCH RESULTS ANTICIPATORY EFFECTS......................... 25 
C. RESEARCH RESULTS DIFFUSION EFFECTS ................................ 29 
D. RESEARCH RESULTS RESIDUAL EFFECTS ................................. 34 
E. SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................. 38 
V. STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................... 39 
A. TARGET, TIP, TARGET (T3) OSCILLATION TACTIC...................... 39 
B. A BULL’S EYE STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION..................... 40 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 43 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 45 
 
  viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Effect of Operations and Security Measures on Insurgent Violence 
in the Absence of Military Information Support .................................11 
Figure 2. How a Supporting MISO Campaign Can Increase the Effectiveness 
of the Same Operations and Security Measures ..............................12 
Figure 3. Oscillatory Security Force Operations Model ...................................20 
Figure 4. Map of Drug Crime Target Site and Catchment Areas .....................30 
Figure 5. Observed Drug Activities ..................................................................32 
Figure 6. Observed Incidents of Disorder ........................................................33 
Figure 7. The Bull’s Eye Resource and MISO Targeting Cycle .......................41 
 
  x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Published Evaluation of Crime Deterrence Initiatives with Recorded 
Anticipatory Effects...........................................................................28 
Table 2. Effects of Crackdowns by Time Length ............................................37 
 
  xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CIED   Counter Improvised Explosive Device  
CNO   Computer Network Operations  
EW   Electronic Warfare  
F2F   Face–to-Face  
FinCen   Financial Enforcement Network  
IED   Improvised Explosive Device 
IO   Information Operations  
JIOPH   Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook  
MILDEC   Military Deception  
MISO  Military Information Support Operations 
MOAB   Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb 
OPSEC   Operations Security  
PSYOP   Psychological Operations  
T3  Target, Tip, Target  
  xiv






This research examines the extent to which Information Operations (IO) 
can be used to disrupt insurgent violence and crime.  This topic arises from the 
observation that a reduction in violence and crime often occurs before the onset 
of police crackdowns, and that this disruption in criminal activity continues for an 
extended period of time after the operations have concluded.  This reduction in 
crime can also transpire outside the geographical boundaries of where 
operations are occurring or where no physical security measures, have, or will be 
implemented. 
Recognizing that these effects happen provides an opportunity to 
maximize the effectiveness of other counterinsurgency measures.  It can be 
surmised that an offender or an insurgent assumes that counterinsurgency 
measures have already been implemented, or that the measures are still 
ongoing, and therefore, makes the decision not to commit an act of violence at 
that time or place.  It appears that an insurgent’s perception of circumstance or 
risk may be central to the decision-making process. 
According to Clarke, Smith, and Pease, “if perception is indeed central, a 
change in crime rates will coincide with changed perception rather than changed 
practice, when these are not coincident in time.”1  Similarly, a reduction in 
insurgent activity is the result of a perceptional change when it does not coincide 
in time or space with a kinetic operation or other change in practice, which leads 
to several questions that have important implications to counterinsurgency 
operations.   
                                            
1Martha J. Smith, Ronald V. Clarke, and Ken Pease, "Anticipatory Benefits in Crime 




A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is, “can IO 
disrupt insurgent activity and increase the deterrent effect of kinetic operations 
and other security measures?”  In addition, this research also addresses the 
following questions.  Can violence be reduced by disseminating information 
about counterinsurgency operations and other physical security measures that 
will not, or have yet to be implemented?  More importantly, can IO achieve a 
decrease in insurgent violence and crime as a standalone operation?  Insofar as 
IO can be used to deter violence and crime, how much effect can be achieved 
without the reinforcement of physical security measures or kinetic operations?  If 
these questions can be answered affirmatively, then generating these effects 
could redefine the way MISO seeks to support a commander’s objectives. 
B. HYPOTHESIS  
IO can be used to affect an insurgent’s perception of expected risk, 
certainty about expected risk, and anticipated rewards to achieve information-
generated effects.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used to explore this subject is to reevaluate research 
from criminology that has studied information-generated effects in police 
operations from a military perspective.  Research within criminology was selected 
because of the similarity between law enforcement in a high crime area and 
steady state counterinsurgency operations.   
Material selected as empirical data for this research consists of published 
reports observing for information-generated effects and measures actual 
changes in crime rates.  Based upon these criteria, three studies were selected 
for examination.  Together, these studies evaluated over 232-crime deterrence 




This analysis first looks to demonstrate the occurrence of information-
generated effects (anticipatory, diffusion, and residual effects) in police 
operations.  The second objective is to show a correlation between publicizing 
certain aspects about police operations and a reduction in crime.  Third, theorize 
that these effects can be achieved through IO and other oscillatory military 









II. INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS 
A. INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS  
Joint Publication 3-13 “Information Operations” describes IO “…as the 
integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations 
(CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and 
operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and 
automated decision making while protecting our own.”2 
From this definition, the primary purpose or mission of IO is to influence 
the decisions, and ultimately, the behavior of a specified target audience.  An IO 
effect then is primarily a change in behavior.  The Joint Information Operations 
Planning Handbook (JIOPH) says, “an effect itself is a clearly defined outcome or 
modification to a behavior that you want to achieve on a specific target or 
audience.”3  It is important at this point to differentiate information-generated 
effects from effects occurring as a direct result of an action.  Information-
generated effects and action-based effects are inextricably linked; both seek to 
influence changes in behavior, but the changes result from different causal 
variables.  Therefore, information-generated effects must be defined differently, 
and analyzed separately.   
The JIOPH defines an effect as the physical and/or behavioral state of a 
system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.  An effect 
according to the JIOPH is the result, outcome, or consequence of an action, as 
well as a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.4  
                                            
2 Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf#search="3-13."  
3 Joint Force Staff College (U.S.), Information Warfare Division, Joint Information Operations 
Planning Handbook (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 2009), 4.3.22. 




B. DEFINING INFORMATION-GENERATED EFFECTS 
Information-generated effects result from a change in perception in 
response to information.  These effects should be defined by, planned for, and 
evaluated upon the principal that perception is central when a change in behavior 
does not coincide in time or space with an action or some other change in 
practice.   
Therefore, an information-generated effect can be defined as a change in 
the physical and/or behavioral state of a system resulting from a response to 
information when the change in behavior does not coincide in time or space with 
an action or some other change in practice.  An information-generated effect is 
further defined as a significant change in the physical and/or behavioral state of a 
system that cannot be solely attributed to an action or other change in practice.   
Three types of information-generated effects exist in which perception is 
considered a causal variable in achieving a change in behavior: 1) anticipatory 
effects, 2) diffusion effects, and 3) residual effects.  
1. Anticipatory Effects 
An anticipatory effect is a term coined within criminology referring to a 
change in the behavior of a target audience that occurs too early for it to be 
attributed to an operation, countermeasure, action or other change in practice 
that has occurred.  Anticipatory effects are thought to occur because a target 
audience perceives that an operation, countermeasure, or other change in 
practice has actually started, or that the change in practice is imminent.  
Therefore, a change in behavior occurs before an operation or change in practice 
actually begins.   
Anticipatory effects amount to prima facie evidence that a change in 
behavior is an information-generated effect resulting from a change in perception 
since the execution of an action, planned operation, or any other change in 




Anticipatory effects can be described using the common bomb versus 
leaflet analogy.  Suppose an enemy defensive line exists consisting of three 
geographically separated hardened positions.  The friendly commander’s 
objective is to influence the enemy to abandon the positions or reposition forces 
away from bunkers to be able to overrun the positions with minimal casualties.  
To achieve this objective, one Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb (MOAB), and 
an unlimited number of leaflets printed with messages are available that can be 
used to communicate with and influence the defenders. 
An example of anticipatory effects occurs when the enemy either 
abandons or partially abandons one or more of the positions after leaflets are 
dropped threatening the use of the MOAB bomb.  This repositioning of enemy 
forces is an anticipatory effect because it occurs before any action or change in 
practice happens.  This amounts to prima facie evidence of an information-
generated effect because dropping the MOAB is not necessary to achieve the 
desired behavioral change.   
Empirically, evidence of anticipatory effects can be found in similar 
situations within criminology.  Anticipatory effects are often observed prior to the 
onset of police crackdowns and other crime prevention initiatives.  A crackdown 
is a sudden increase in officer presence, sanctions, and threats of apprehension 
either for specific offenses or all offenses in specific places.5  A crackdown can 
be compared to a military troop surge or a short-term operation that targets a 




                                            
5 Lawrence W. Sherman, "Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence," Crime and 




In a study of anticipatory effects related to crime prevention initiatives, 
researchers examined 210 cases studies, and 52 of these reports were detailed 
enough to observe for anticipatory effects.  Of the 52 cases, 22 showed evidence 
of anticipatory effects.6   
The study identified several possible reasons for anticipatory effects, but 
focused on what was referred to as the publicity/disinformation effect.  In other 
words, information-generated effects occur as a reaction to information or 
disinformation about changes in police presence or activities.   
2. Diffusion Effects 
Diffusion effects are changes in behavior that occur outside the 
geographical areas where actions have occurred, beyond the target set that is 
the subject of control, or beyond the activities that are the focus of initial action.7  
Diffusion effects are also defined by a statistically significant change in behavior 
from a target audience that cannot be solely attributed to an action or other 
change in practice.  Diffusion may occur because the target audience is likely to 
be aware that an operation, action or other change in practice is occurring, but 
they are uncertain about the target or the boundaries of where the operations are 
happening.  Consequently, the target audience changes its behavior. 
Diffusion effects can also be described using the leaflet and bomb 
analogy.  Using the same scenario of three hardened bunkers, and after initially 
achieving anticipatory effects, the commander orders the single MOAB bomb to 
be dropped on the middle defensive position.  The defenders sustain 50 percent 
casualties and the bunker is heavily damaged.  At the same time, a leaflet drop is 
conducted over all three bunkers advising the remaining defenders to abandon 
their positions or face similar consequences. 
                                            
6 Martha J. Smith, Ronald V. Clarke, and Ken Pease, “Anticipatory Benefits in Crime 
Prevention,” 71–88. 




Any repositioning of enemy forces from bunkers not actually bombed is a 
diffusion effect since the change in behavior is happening outside the 
geographical area of where the bombing occurred.  The defenders in the bunkers 
to the right and left were not directly affected by the MOAB bomb; they have only 
heard about it, by word of mouth, or from reading one of the friendly 
commander’s leaflets.  The diffusion effect occurs in response to both the 
planned and unplanned dissemination of information about the middle position 
that was bombed.   
Diffusion effects are evidence that a change in behavior is, in part, an 
information-generated effect.  This assertion is based upon the principle that 
perception is greater than or equal to action in motivating human behavior when 
a change occurs in the behavior of a target audience not directly affected by an 
action or other change in practice.  Diffusion effects are different from 
anticipatory and residual effects in that they occur at the same time as an 
ongoing operation.  Diffusion effects are spatial; they occur beyond places that 
operations are occurring.  Regardless of the exact causal variable, diffusion 
effects do happen, and an attempt to exploit them should be made to increase 
the effectiveness of U.S. actions and interventions.  
Consider the following analogy that also illustrates diffusion effects.  A 
two-week troop surge supported by a Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO) campaign is conducted in a specific geographical area.  During the 
surge, five insurgents are killed or captured.  Insurgent attacks decrease 80 
percent from 100 attacks during the month prior to the troop surge, to 20 attacks 
during the month after the troop surge.  This is a statistically significant decrease 
in attacks that cannot be solely attributed to the incapacitation of the five 
insurgents.   
The troop surge has a strong claim to being the independent variable that 
resulted in the decrease in insurgent attacks.  However, the troop surge only 




indirectly affected members of the insurgent population who heard about it in one 
way or another.  This may or may not account for the statistically significant drop 
in attacks outside of those that could have been reasonably conducted by the 
five incapacitated insurgents.   
In studying the effects of publicity in crime prevention schemes, Johnson 
and Bowers state that operations and countermeasures seldom occur in the 
absence of publicity, be it formal or informal.  They suggest that many insurgents 
become aware of countermeasures even before implementation begins, and that 
their perceptions of risk may be changed even if they are not interdicted by an 
operation themselves.8 
Emanuel Barthe shows how information can be used to increase the 
effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations and other physical security 
measures.  Select information is disseminated that attracts the attention of a 
target audience and increases its awareness of specific counterinsurgency 
operations and other security measures occurring in circumscribed areas, which 
is the means being used to generate information effects. 
Surely, a symbiotic relationship exists between kinetic-effects and 
information-generated effects.  An appropriate mix of actions must be taken and 
information disseminated to maximize both types of effects.  Figure 1 illustrates 
the effect of operations and security measures on insurgent violence in the 
absence of a MISO campaign.  While the interventions do deter a segment of the 





                                            
8 Shane D. Johnson and Kate Bowers, Home Office. Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate, Reducing Burglary Initiative the Role of Publicity in Crime Prevention (London: Home 




this partly occurs because the deterrent effect is limited to those insurgents who 
have either heard about the interventions or who have been directly affected by 
them.9 
 
Figure 1.   Effect of Operations and Security Measures on Insurgent Violence 
in the Absence of Military Information Support10 
Figure 2 shows how a military information support operations campaign 
can increase the effectiveness of the same operations and security measures by 
publicizing or disseminating select information about the interventions to increase 
the insurgent’s perception of risk, and the latter’s uncertainty about those risks.  
Through a MISO campaign, a larger segment of the insurgent population 
becomes aware of the increased risks, which results in a further decrease in 
violence and other criminal activity. 
 
                                            
9 Emmanuel Barthe and United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, "Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns," U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of 






Figure 2.   How a Supporting MISO Campaign Can Increase the Effectiveness 
of the Same Operations and Security Measures11 
3. Residual Effects 
The final information-generated effect to be discussed is the residual 
effect, which occurs when a change in behavior continues for an extended period 
of time after an action has been taken, or when the continued behavioral change 
can no longer be solely attributed to the action.  Residual effects may happen, in 
part, because the target audience believes that “something” is still going on, or 
that something similar is likely to take place again, such as the dropping of 
another MOAB bomb. 
Returning to the leaflet and bomb analogy, assume that no more MOAB 
bombs are available to be dropped on the defenders who still remain in the 
defensive positions.  Another leaflet drop is conducted warning that anyone who 
refuses to abandon their positions are likely to be killed in the next attack, and 
this time the attack is to come without warning.  If the enemy commander further 
repositions forces, or if soldiers break ranks and flee, this can be considered a 
residual effect.   
 
                                            
11 Emmanuel Barthe and United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 




Residual effects are more clearly observed after crackdowns, troop 
surges, or other oscillatory actions.  Often after a crackdown, crime and other 
nefarious activities remain lower even after the enforcement action has been 
concluded.  These residual effects often decay over time, but “lag” time occurs 
before the activities return to their original levels.  Many criminologists argue that 
this lag time might be increased by disseminating information about police or 
security force actions happening in circumscribed areas. 
Lawrence Sherman, who conducted a study of initial and residual 
deterrence related to police crackdowns, found evidence of residual effects.  
Sherman recommended oscillatory enforcement strategies where the onsets are 
highly publicized and the back-offs are conducted with little or no publicity.12 
Sherman and other criminologists argue that publicity or information plays some 
role in achieving these effects because the effects do not coincide in time or 
space with the actions or interventions implemented.   
C. SUMMATION 
This chapter defined three types of information-generated effects and has 
differentiated these effects from action-based effects.  Distinguishing between 
the three types of information-generated effects and the principles that define 
them are fundamental considerations in planning information operations.  These 
distinctions between the types of effects imply that the information used to 
achieve the effects and the timing of its dissemination may be different.  The 
same principles that define information-generated effects can also be used to 
indentify measures of effectiveness for some information operations.  Perception 
is central when the effect is not coincident in time or space with an action.  
Therefore, effects that occur beyond the time and space of an action have a 
stronger claim to being information generated. 
                                            




Anticipatory effects demonstrate that taking an action is not always a 
necessary condition to achieving a behavioral change from a target audience.  
Recognizing that a physical and/or behavioral state of a system can be changed, 
at times, without taking any action suggests that some operations can be based 





III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
To understand how information can change the behavior of a target 
audience, it is important to consider the following theoretical perspectives or 
concepts: the rational choice perspective, the interdependency of insurgent 
decision making, and the proportional relationship between risk and certainty.  
These theoretical perspectives have important considerations for strategy, 
as well as for achieving information effects; therefore, both aspects are analyzed.  
This section focuses on how these theories influence the behavior of target 
audience, such as insurgents, and how disseminating information about security 
force actions occurring in circumscribed places can reduce insurgent violence 
and crime. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
IO can be used to affect an insurgent’s perception of expected risk, 
certainty about expected risk, and anticipated rewards to achieve information-
generated effects.   
B. RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
The rational choice perspective states that an insurgent makes a decision 
about whether to commit an attack based upon a balance between the 
anticipated rewards and the perceived efforts and risks involved in the act, and if, 
in the insurgent’s opinion, a sufficient reason exists for committing the attack.  
The theory also posits that an insurgent continually revises perceptions of effort, 
risk, and rewards based upon experiences rather than assuming them to be 
constant over time.  Therefore, information that disrupts an insurgent’s 
perception of risk, effort, and reward in relation to the act can affect the decision 




C. DECISION INTERDEPENDENCY AMONG POTENTIAL CRIMINALS 
AND INSURGENTS 
Decision interdependency among potential criminals and insurgents refers 
to the observations that reinforcing peer-group decision interdependency makes 
high crime rates higher and low crime rates lower.  For example, a person 
speeds on the highway when many other people are speeding. People riot when 
many other people are rioting. People persecute minorities when other people 
are doing the same.  This thesis posits that a potential insurgent is also more 
likely to support or participate in an insurgency when perceiving that many others 
are also supporting and participating.  This argument also applies to the decision 
to commit specific types of insurgent violence, such as emplacing improvised 
explosive devices and suicide bombings.13 
Reinforcing decision interdependency leads to self-sustaining increasing 
or decreasing patterns of violence once a certain level of activity is reached.  
Benjamini and Maitial emphasized that a connection exists between a person’s 
subjective probability of being detected when committing a criminal act and the 
perception of how many other people are engaging in the same behavior.14 
Decision interdependency amongst insurgents says that when many 
people are supporting an insurgency that most other potential insurgents should 
also support it, and when the perception is that the majority of potential 
insurgents are supporting the state, then most others do likewise.  
The effects of decision interdependence also have important implications 
for strategy.  This suggests it is necessary to get a critical mass or a high 
percentage of the population to submit to the authority of the state before it is 
possible to generate momentum towards achieving a stable environment.  This 
 
                                            
13 Avinash K. Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in 
Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (New York: Norton, 1991).   
14 Cyrus Chu, "Oscillatory vs. Stationary Enforcement of Law," International Review of Law 




critical mass premise is often referred to as tipping point.  To achieve a desired 
change in behavior it is often necessary to “tip” it by suppressing or compelling it 
until reaching a self sustaining rate of activity. 
The policy implication is that rotating troop surges, crackdowns against 
specific activities, and short periods of intense counterinsurgency operations are 
more effective than the same total effort applied at less intensity over a longer 
period. 
D. THE PROPORTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY  
Disseminating information that a security force is taking specific types of 
actions in circumscribed places can achieve effects because the information 
disrupts the certainty of a criminal or an insurgent’s perception of risk.   
Lawrence Sherman, in a study of initial and residual deterrence, argues 
that when a stable probability of detection exists throughout the year, an 
insurgent can be reasonably certain about their perception of risk.  However, if 
information is received of an increase in risk, even if only temporary or 
intermittently, then the potential insurgent may substantially overestimate said 
risk just to be safe.15 
Richard Heuer, in discussing the cognitive factors in deception and 
counter deception, states that overestimating probabilities results from a 
cognitive human bias known as the “availability rule.”  The availability rule states 
that estimating probabilities is often based on how easily it is possible to retrieve 





                                            




easily recalled.  Information, it can be argued, makes thoughts of risk more 
available, easier to retrieve, and easier to recall, which then causes an offender 
to overestimate the perception of risk.16 
Sherman also suggests oscillatory enforcement practices that onset with 
much publicity and back-off with little or no publicity, are more effective than a 
steady state strategy.  The distinction between risk and certainty is important 
because oscillatory tactics, such as crackdowns or surges, may increase 
uncertainty just as much as they increase actual risk.  This rise in uncertainty 
about the current level of risk then increases the perceived level of risk beyond 
its normal overestimations.17 
Cyrus Chu, an economist at the National Taiwan University, 
mathematically justifies a similar concept in an article entitled “Oscillatory vs. 
Stationary Enforcement of Law.” Chu’s research demonstrates, “under some 
parametric specifications, it will be shown that every stationary (or constant) 
enforcement policy can be dominated by some oscillatory ones, and this result 
provides a possible justification for oscillatory law enforcement on the part of the 
government.”18  Although Chu’s research did not focus on politically motivated 
crime, his analysis can be easily applied to the study of insurgency and terrorism. 
Assume that it takes the same number of security forces to create an 
actual interdiction rate of 20 percent during normal Counter Improvised Explosive 
Device (CIED) operations as it does to vary the risk between 0 and 40 percent.  
Sherman argues that it is more effective to choose the variable option because it 
can keep the perceived risk twice as high as the security force can impose 
through a constant level of operations.19 
                                            
16 Richards J. Heuer and Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.), Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1999). 
17 Lawrence Sherman, “Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence,” 1–48. 





This concept can be shown graphically. Figure 3 shows the hypothetical 
differences between an insurgent’s perception of risk resulting from an oscillatory 
CIED strategy of surging and crackdowns (the curved line), and the average 
actual risk from a constant level of CIED operations (horizontal line).  The model 
shows the actual risk from an oscillatory strategy varying from 0 to 40 percent at 
any given time represented along the curved line.  The model assumes that the 
insurgent perceives the level of risk to remain constant with the actual risk that 
coincides with the peaks of the oscillations in operations, which occurs because 
oscillation in operations increases uncertainty, and thus, makes it difficult to 
estimate the risk between the peaks accurately. Therefore, the level of perceived 
risk remains elevated.  Disseminating information about counterinsurgency 
operations occurring in circumscribed areas also disrupts an insurgent’s certainty 
about the estimation of risk, which similarly leads to a further overestimation of 






Figure 3.   Oscillatory Security Force Operations Model20 
To illustrate how this hypothetical model might work in practice, imagine 
that a religious charity wants to provide financial support to a known terrorist 
group.  The religious charity knows that the U.S. Treasury Department’s 
Financial Enforcement Network (FinCen) has only the resources to audit or 
investigate five percent of the suspicious financial transactions made by religious 
charities, and empirically-generated indicators trigger these investigations. 
Now suppose that FinCen begins to select audit targets at random.  These 
random audits (with replacement) are stratified by religious affiliation so that half 
of the charities are audited unpredictably on average of once every 10 years.  
                                            




The suspect charity would probably find this more deterring than a low constant 
possibility of an audit based upon a computer-generated tipoff, and this strategy 
costs FinCen nothing in terms of additional resources.  Sherman argues that if 
this approach is highly publicized through mass media and actual audit contacts, 
it may result in fewer convictions for providing material support, but can result in 
a lower overall level of terrorist financing.21  The same logic can be applied to 
counterinsurgency tactics.   
Perhaps an insurgent would be less likely to emplace Improvised 
Explosive Device (IEDs) if it were publicized that hunter sniper teams would be 
hidden randomly along 50 percent of the main supply routes one out of every 10 
nights.  It would be also possible that insurgents would receive less support from 
the population if it were publicized that anyone convicted of doing so, on one out 
of every five days, would receive a life sentence and forfeit all their assets to the 
state.   
E. DECAYING EFFECTS AND DECAYING IMPLEMENTATION 
These theoretical principles also imply that oscillation is necessary to 
minimize decaying effects and implementation.  Decay refers to a gradual decline 
from initial changes.  Empirically, it is difficult to maintain a crackdown or surge 
effectively over a long period of time.  Over time, an offender population begins 
to make more and more accurate risk assessments and becomes more certain of 
those assessments.  As more criminals or insurgents begin to reengage in 
nefarious activities, it becomes safer and more rewarding for others to do so, and 
the activity level begins to rise.   
Sherman and the availability rule suggest that the initial heightened 
perceptions of risk decay slowly, even after enforcement activity returns to the 
initial level,22 which implies that surges and crackdowns should be of short 
                                            





duration and randomly shifted from area to area alternating between different 
target sets to exploit the naturally occurring residual effects.  More simply stated, 
short-term operations often achieve the same effects as a long-term operation 
because of residual effects and the way operations have a propensity to decay 
over time. 
F. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
The rational choice perspective, the interdependency of insurgent decision 
making, and the concepts of risk and certainty, imply that insurgents continually 
revise their perceptions of risk, certainty about expected risk, and anticipated 
rewards based upon their experiences, and their perceptions of what other 
people are doing rather than assuming them to be constant over time.  
Information that disrupts an insurgent’s perception of risk, effort and reward in 
relation to an act affects decisions about taking that action.  
Operationally, under similar parameters, it can be shown that some 
oscillatory approaches are more effective than the same total effort applied at 
less intensity over a longer period of time, and this provides a possible 
justification for an oscillatory counterinsurgency strategy.  This strategy should 
include focused operations against different insurgent activities and troop surges 
of short duration randomly shifted from area to area alternating between different 
target sets.   
Disseminating select information about operations and physical security 
measures in circumscribed areas affects an insurgent’s perception of expected 
risk, certainty about expected risk, and anticipated rewards.  Information 
Operations, therefore, can increase the effectiveness of counterinsurgency 
operations and physical security measures, and at times, reduces insurgent 




IV. AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION-GENERATED 
EFFECTS 
This chapter seeks to achieve three things.  First, this analysis looks to 
demonstrate the occurrence of information-generated effects (anticipatory, 
diffusion, and residual effects) in police operations.  The second objective is to 
show a correlation between publicizing certain aspects about police operations 
and a reduction in crime.  Third, theorize that these effects can be achieved 
through IO and other oscillatory military operations.   
Testing whether information operations, and in particular MISO can 
influence the behavior of an insurgent and obtain information-generated effects, 
is difficult because little formal research exists on these subjects within the 
military.  Most evaluations to date have consisted of MISO operators informally 
attempting to identify quantifiable measures of effectiveness in relation to their 
specific programs that show: 1) the target audience’s awareness of a MISO 
campaign, 2) if after exposure to a MISO message a target audience changed its 
attitude about the subject, and 3) claimed or actual desired behavioral changes 
from the target audience.   
This deficit in formal research within the military can be partially overcome 
by reevaluating research from criminology that has studied the effects of publicity 
and information-generated effects in police operations.  Material selected as 
empirical data for this research consists of published reports observing for 
information-generated effects and measures actual changes in crime rates. 
Based upon these criteria, three studies were selected for examination.  
Together, these studies evaluated over 232 crime deterrence initiatives detailed 




A. ANTICIPATORY, DIFFUSION, AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS 
This section summarizes the results of three studies that show the 
occurrence of anticipatory, diffusion, and residual effects in police operations.  
The first study is entitled Anticipatory Benefits in Crime Prevention, which 
evaluated 52 case studies for anticipatory effects.  The second study is entitled, 
Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner? This study evaluated the results of a 
controlled study of spatial displacement and diffusion of crime control effects.  
The third study is entitled, Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence. 
This research examined 18 case studies of police crackdowns in detail, and 
observed for multiple types of effects.   
In the anticipatory effects study, researchers identified 52 cases detailed 
enough to seek anticipatory effects, and then grouped them into studies that 
demonstrated anticipatory effects and those that did not.  A pre-initiative 
decrease in crime rates was considered evidence of anticipatory effects.23 
The study that asks if crime just moves around the corner is a controlled 
study of spatial diffusion and displacement of crime control effects.  The study 
was conducted by Weisburd et al. with the help of the Jersey City Police 
Department.  The Jersey City Police conducted an intensive crackdown in an 
area of the city with a substantial amount of street level drug crime and disorder.  
Two neighboring areas were selected as “catchment areas” to assess immediate 
spatial displacement or diffusion. Intensive police interventions were applied to 
the target site but not applied to the catchment areas. More than 6,000 20-minute 
social observations were conducted in the target and catchment areas during the 
study period.  This data is supplemented by interviews and ethnographic field 
observations.24  
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In studying residual and initial effects of crackdowns, Sherman produced a 
chart that shows four different types of effects coming from short-term and long-
term crackdowns.  The four effects notated in the chart are initial, displacement, 
decay, and residual effects.  The occurrence of residual effects is of primary 
importance to this research because it is an information-generated effect as 
defined earlier in this thesis.  Initial effects in the cited study of crackdowns are 
not the same as anticipatory effects because they coincide with start of the 
crackdown itself.  However, the results are interesting and the chart will be 
included in its entirety as similar patterns can occur during similar types of 
counterinsurgency operations. 
Sherman also discusses the effects that publicity or media threats may 
have on achieving initial and residual effects.  In at least one case (an area 
crackdown in Georgetown) aided by massive amounts of publicity, crime rates 
remained lower for a long period of time after the crackdown had ended.  These 
residual effects can be attributed in part to a public perception that the crackdown 
was still ongoing after it had been concluded.  A survey conducted a month after 
the crackdown ended showed that 55 percent of the respondents thought that the 
initiative was still in force with no back-off.  One hundred percent of the 
respondents thought that the area was less crowded, 92 percent thought it was 
safer, and 80 percent thought there was less crime. These types of results 
caused Sherman to speculate that crackdowns should onset with much publicity, 
and back-off with little publicity being careful not to “exhaust the bluff through 
overuse.”25 
B. RESEARCH RESULTS ANTICIPATORY EFFECTS 
An anticipatory effect is a change in behavior that occurs too early for it to 
be attributed to an operation.  Smith et al. sought anticipatory effects by 
examining 142 crime deterrence initiatives that occurred at 211 different 
                                            




locations.  Out of these 142 initiatives, only 52 were sufficiently detailed to 
observe of anticipatory effects.  This suggests that most police operations are not 
conducted to observe for effect onset.   
Of the 52 sufficiently detailed evaluations, 22 of them showed prima facie 
evidence of anticipatory effects.  This equates to approximately 40 percent of the 
studies reviewed showing anticipatory effects, which indicates anticipatory effects 
may be a common occurrence.  According to Smith et al., “crude as this trawl is, 
it suggests that anticipatory benefits are not a rare phenomena, and that, as a 
minimum, evaluation studies should contain enough information to allow these 
effects to show themselves.” 26 
Table 1 lists seven case studies where the original researchers identified 
anticipatory effects and provided a putative causal mechanism for them.  Two of 
the cases are particularly interesting when considering how MISO may generate 
anticipatory effects.   
Smith et al. notes that in Barclay et al. (1997), while studying the effects of 
security cycle patrols on parking lot crime, that publicizing the initiative was 
followed by a reduction in crime “before foot was ever laid to pedal.”  The offset 
of the initiative was not immediately followed by an increase in crime, an example 
of a residual effect.27 
In Ross 1973, studying the effect of legislation on compulsory testing of 
blood alcohol levels of drivers, showed a reduction in the number of charges for 
failing to stop at an accident after breath test legislation was reported in the 
media.  This case is often cited in other research as a publicity effect because 
the media reports a decrease in citations occurred in 1965, but the law did not 
take effect until 1967.  A further reduction in citations happened after the law was 
actually implemented in 1967.  This pre-implementation decrease in citations, at 
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first look, appears to be a publicity-generated anticipatory effect.  Researchers 
surmised that potential offenders may have thought that the law had taken effect 
when it was originally reported in the media two years before its actual 
implementation. 
 
Published Evaluation of Crime Deterrence Initiatives with 
Recorded Anticipatory Effects 











Vehicle crime and 
other property crime – 
March 1995 
First camera became 
operational in April 1995. 
Publicity associated with 
planned camera 
installation. 






Vehicle thefts – late 
March 1995. 
Publicity campaign began 
March 11, 1995. 
Bike patrol implemented 
on April 1, 1995. 
Offenders unsure when 








Burglary – Dec. 1992 
Criminal damage & 
other theft – Jan. 
1993 
Cameras installed in Nov. 
1992. 
Cameras fully operational 
in March 1993. 
Offenders may have 
thought cameras were 
working as soon as they 
were installed. 









Thefts of cars – Oct. 
1981 
Thefts from cars – 
July 1982 
Consultation on Estate 
began in Sept. 1981. 
Action Plan agreed June 
1982. 
Offenders may have 
altered their offending 
patterns due to 




Great Britain Legislation on 
compulsory testing 
of blood alcohol 
levels of driers 
Failing to stop after 
an accident-dropped 
in 1965, remained 
stable in 1966 and 
dropped again in 
1967 
Proposed legislation on 
compulsory testing of 
blood alcohol levels 
presented in Dec. 1965. 
Law became effective in 
Oct. 1967. 
Drivers may have thought 
that the law had gone into 
effect when the legislation 




Published Evaluation of Crime Deterrence Initiatives with 
Recorded Anticipatory Effects 









CCTV system Criminal damage –
Jan. 1997 
Shoplifting & All crime 
– Feb. 1997 
CCTV operational April 
1997. 
"All crime" drop attributed 
to the visibility of the 
CCTV installation work. 
Sharp pre-operational 
drop in shop- lifting 
attributed to other policing 







Tailored alarm or 
detection mea-
surer or security 
advice 
Non-domestic 
burglary dropped in 
fourth quarter 1995 
Princess Anne 
announced initiative 
designed to assist small 
businesses in third 
quarter 1995. 
The initiative began 
during second quarter 
1996. 
Offenders may have 
thought initiative began 
when announced. 
Table 1.   Published Evaluation of Crime Deterrence Initiatives with Recorded 
Anticipatory Effects 
Smith et al. identified several reasons that anticipatory effects may occur.  
Several of these possible explanations appear to be exploitable by a counter 
insurgent or an IO planner.  These exploitable explanations include the following. 
(1) Creeping implementation, where some elements of a program are 
put in place before an official start date 
(2) Preparation-disruption effects, where surveillance is a by-product of 
installation of crime-reductive hardware, such as street lighting or 
fencing 
(3) Preparation-training effects, where planning, population surveys, 
etc. render officers or soldiers better equipped personally to 
understand and reduce local criminal or insurgent activity 
(4) Motivation of officers or soldiers involved to make an initiative a 
success, which translates itself into better performance in advance 
of the initiative itself 
(5) Preparation-anticipation effects, where equipment is deemed by 




(6) Publicity/disinformation effects, whereby covert measures are 
presumed to exist as a result of publicity or hearsay28 
Publicity and disinformation effects have the most profound implications 
for information operations.  Although the design of most studies makes it difficult 
to determine the cause of anticipatory effects conclusively, some studies show a 
correlation between a decrease in crime rates and publicity.   
C. RESEARCH RESULTS DIFFUSION EFFECTS 
Diffusion effects are changes in behavior that occur outside the 
geographical areas where operations are occurring, beyond the target set of an 
operation, or beyond the activities, which are the focus of initial actions.  
Weisburd et al., with the help of the Jersey City Police, conducted an 
intense crackdown in a high crime area of Jersey City.  Weisburd et al. observed 
for diffusion and spatial displacement effects of drug crimes by establishing two 
concentric catchments areas outside the target area of the crackdown.  No police 
interventions were conducted in the catchment areas except emergency calls for 
service.  
The catchment areas were set up to determine if crime deterred in the 
crackdown area would simply displace (move around the corner), or alternatively, 
would the crime reduction benefit from the crackdown area diffuse into the 
concentric catchment areas.  
Street level drug crime was targeted in the crackdown area.  Drug crime 
was targeted because it generates income for the perpetrators.  Researchers 
assumed that drug dealers would feel strong pressure to continue their criminal 
activities in spite of an increase in police interventions.29 
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The crackdown area contained two major drug markets, and was located 
in a densely populated urban neighborhood.  Half of the 96 buildings in the target 
area were three-story structures with a business on the ground floor and 
apartment units on the upper floors, and many of the other buildings consisted of 
multifamily dwellings.  The area also contained a large number of vacant lots, 
abandoned buildings, and exhibited signs of physical decay, such as burned out 
buildings, graffiti, broken glass, and drug paraphernalia.  Figure 4 shows the map 
of the drug crime target site and the two concentric catchment areas. 
 
Figure 4.   Map of Drug Crime Target Site and Catchment Areas30 
Researchers measured the effects of the police operations through social 
observations using street segments as the unit of analysis.  Drug crime is more 
accurately measured through observational methods, because it often occurs on 
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the street in plain view.  Weisburd et al. explain that social observation has a rich 
tradition in criminology although it is seldom used because of the considerable 
expense involved.31 
Observers recorded drug-related events in a code book on their assigned 
street segments from one street corner to the next.  Nine waves of social 
observation were conducted in the drug crime target site: one before, six during, 
and two after the police operation.  Each wave was conducted over a 7-day 
period with each observation lasting 20 minutes. Fifty-two were scheduled in a 
day and 364 in a wave.  Researchers completed a total of 3,063 observations in 
the drug crime site.32 
Researchers also conducted 6,129 observations in the catchment areas 
over a 9-month period to measure possible spatial displacement and diffusion 
effects.  Observers recorded activity on one street segment in each catchment 
area every hour between noon and midnight, and observed a randomly selected 
second street segment in each catchment area every hour between 4:00 p.m. 
and 10:00 p.m. because these hours represented the highest hours of activity.33 
Weisburd et al. combined three types of observations of drug-related 
behavior to assess possible displacement and diffusion of drug activity from the 
drug crime site: soliciting for a drug sale, involvement in a drug transaction, and 
observed use of drugs. Using this measure, researchers measured a large 
reduction in observed drug-related behavior in the first month of the operation, 
this disruption continues throughout the operation, and through a two-month 
observed residual period (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.   Observed Drug Activities34  
Figure 5 demonstrates that diffusion effects can occur as there is a 
decrease in drug activity in the catchment areas similar to the decrease within 
the drug crime target area.  Weisburd also suggests that displacement of drug 
activity does not occur from the target area into the catchment areas. 
The evidence of diffusion is also reinforced by a decrease in the number 
of observed incidents of disorder in both the target and catchment areas as 
shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Observed Incidents of Disorder35 
It is easy to understand why a decrease of drug activity occurs within the 
target area, but why crime also decreased in the catchment areas is not as 
intuitive.  Weisburd et al. explains that crime does not just move around the 
corner because the criminal, like the insurgent, has to balance the effort, risk, 
and opportunities with the benefits gained from criminal activities. 
Weisburd’s explanation is supported by several interviews conducted with 
drug dealers arrested during the police operation.  These interviews suggest that 
spatial movement of crime sites, or target sites for an insurgent, involves 
substantial effort and risk for offenders.36  
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Many of the offenders interviewed complained about the time and effort it 
would take to reestablish their activities to other areas in response to police 
operations.  One arrestee from the target site explained that “the money won’t be 
the same” and that “it takes time to build up customers.”  Offenders also cited risk 
as another reason that they could not just move around the corner to evade a 
crackdown.  Another arrestee explained this in plain words, “you really can’t deal 
in areas that you aren’t living in, it ain’t your turf.  That’s how people get 
themselves killed.”37 
Diffusion effects can be achieved during military operations for the same 
reasons.  An insurgent will face the same constraints of increased effort and risk 
when moving operations to evade the counterinsurgent.  The insurgent would 
also have to start from scratch in someone else’s turf, and this substantially 
increases the risk of getting captured or killed.  IO can be used to increase these 
perceptions of effort and risk to extend diffusion effects into larger geographical 
areas, and to lengthen the periods of time before the effects decay. 
The factors of increased effort and risk required to spatially displace 
criminal activities suggest that diffusion effects, when they occur, will coincide 
with the start of a police or military operation.  Displacement, if it occurs, will be 
delayed until the criminal or insurgent can overcome the difficulties in 
reestablishing themselves in a new operational area. 
D. RESEARCH RESULTS RESIDUAL EFFECTS 
As stated earlier, Sherman evaluated 18 police crackdowns and observed 
for the occurrence of four types of effects, which were initial deterrence, crime 
displacement, decay, and residual effects.   
Initial deterrence refers to the effect on crime rates immediately after the 
onset of a crackdown, and residual deterrence is the continued deterrent effect 
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after the crackdown has been concluded or backed-off.  Decay is the amount of 
time it takes for the crime rate to return to normal levels, and displacement refers 
to the hypothesis that crime prevented in one area simply moves and occurs in 
an adjacent area.   
Sherman defines a crackdown as a, “sudden increases in officer 
presence, sanctions, and threats of apprehension either for specific offenses or 
for all offenses in specific places.”38  Sherman further defines crackdowns as 
being of short or long term. A short term is defined as a crackdown of six months 
or less.   
Sherman also posits that police crackdowns have three tactical elements:  
presence, sanctions, and media threats.  Presence refers to an increase in 
enforcement personnel and equipment in a geographical area or in particular 
situations.  Increased presence can be accomplished by surging troops and 
equipment into an area (which communicates a visible threat) or through IO that 
increases an insurgent’s uncertainty about the risk of facing an encounter with 
the security force.  Sanctions refer to any coercive COIN imposition on an 
insurgent or potential insurgent, such as stopping cars and pedestrians for 
identification checks, establishing traffic control check points, and cordon and 
search operations, and so on.  Media threats are “announced intentions to 
increase sanctioning certainty.”  Media threats are publicized through 
newspapers, radio announcements, posters and billboards, etc.   
The combinations of these tactical elements vary in implementation.  An 
area crackdown, surge, or saturation operation emphasizes presence, while an 
offense specific crackdown, such as a counter IED operation, emphasizes 
sanctions.  The use of a media campaign in conjunction with other elements of a 
crackdown is often constrained by budgetary concerns in civilian police 
operations.  IO itself can be considered a tactical element of a military operation.  
                                            




Military Information Operations have the capability to announce intentions, 
influence perceptions, deceive, and deny information.  This tactical element of a 
crackdown, media threats or IO, is more exploitable in military operations. 
Table 2 shows that out of 18 case studies of crackdowns, 15 appeared to 
demonstrate initial deterrent effects, which began to decay after a short period, 
sometimes despite the fact that the crackdown is still ongoing.  However, five 
studies with post crackdown data showed residual deterrence well after the 
crackdowns ended. The residual deterrent effects lasted in two cases for a longer 
period than the crackdown itself.39   
Sherman states that the most important and expected conclusion from the 
table is that most crackdowns produce initial deterrence.  Five of the short-term 
crackdowns produced residual effects with no decay; while seven of 10 long-term 
crackdowns that produced initial deterrence also experienced decay.  This short-
term residual effect and long-term decay pattern suggests that the onset or the 
anticipation of a crackdown has the most deterrent effect on a potential criminal 
or an insurgent.   
Sherman argues that although it cannot be determined if the decay cases 
would have shown residual effects if the crackdowns had been stopped sooner, it 
is possible “to speculate that the rebounding crime rates would have looked very 
similar without continued expenditure of police resources.”40  Sherman’s findings 
of initial decay and residual deterrence suggest that crackdowns and surges are 
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New Zealand 1 Yes No No Yes 
New Zealand 2 Yes No No Yes 
Cheshire 1 No Not observed Not observed Not observed 
Cheshire 2 Yes No No Yes 
Georgetown Yes (Parking) Not observed No Yes 
San Diego Field 
interrogations 
Yes Not observed No Yes 
Long Term Efforts: 
Lynn, MA Yes No Yes No 




Local not city 
wide 
Local not City 
Wide 
Not Observed Yes 
Washington D.C. 
(Hanover Place) 
Yes Yes No No 
Washington D.C. 
(Muslims) 
Yes Yes No No 
New York City 
(Lower East Side) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
New York City 
(20th Precinct) 
Yes Yes Yes No 
New York City 
(Subways) 
Yes Not Observed Yes No 
Residential 
RECAP 
Yes Not Observed Yes No 
English DWI Law Yes No Yes No 
French DWI Law Yes No Yes No 
London 
Prostitution 
Yes No No NO 




E. SUMMATION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Smith et al.’s study of anticipatory effects and Sherman’s study of police 
crackdowns both offer publicity and disinformation as a possible reason for the 
occurrence of information-generated effects.  Although publicity effects were not 
studied explicitly by Sherman, he proffers what he refers to as “media threats” to 
be one of three tactical elements of a police crackdown.   
The information disseminated to achieve anticipatory, diffusion, and 
residual effects should disrupt the certainty of a criminal or insurgent’s perception 
of risk in relation to the acts to be deterred.  The timing of dissemination should 
coincide in time and space with the specific effect an IO planner is attempting to 
achieve. 
Information-generated effects can be achieved.  All of the cited studies in 
this thesis demonstrated the occurrence of information-generated effects 
(anticipatory, diffusion, or residual).  In the studies of anticipatory effects and 
deterrent effects of police crackdowns, these effects were observed in 
approximately 40 percent of the cases that contained sufficient data to measure 
for the effects.   
These information-generated effects were not planned for as part of any of 
the evaluated crime deterrent schemes.  The effects occurred incidental to the 
operations, and researchers observed that the disruption in criminal activity was 
not coincident in time with the actual operations.  Thus, information-generated 
effects are a common phenomenon, and if planned for, can be maximized 





V. STRATEGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This final chapter briefly discusses strategy and policy implications.  The 
observations presented in this thesis provide strong evidence of a correlation 
between publicizing certain information about police operations and a decrease 
in crime rates.  The evidence also shows the occurrence of anticipatory, 
diffusion, and residual effects in conjunction with oscillatory police operations.  
This thesis argues that these are information-generated effects caused by a 
change in offender perceptions in response to information received about a 
change in enforcement presence and practices.  This argument is supported by 
the fact that the decrease in crime rates did not always coincide in time or space 
with the police operations themselves.  
Based upon these observations, it is advisable to exploit the benefits of 
oscillatory operations and to plan for all three types of information-generated 
effects: anticipatory, diffusion, and residual effects.  Operations should be 
planned in such a way to collect sufficient information to measure for these 
effects.  To capitalize on the benefits of oscillatory operations and information-
generated effects this research proposes an effective way of targeting resources 
may be to employ a Target, Tip, Target (T3) tactic to maximize the benefits of 
oscillation, and a Bull’s Eye resource and IO targeting cycle to achieve 
anticipatory, diffusion, and residual effects. 
A. TARGET, TIP, TARGET (T3) OSCILLATION TACTIC  
The proportional relationship between risk and uncertainty suggests that 
oscillatory operations are more effective than the same total effort applied at less 
intensity over a longer period time.  The interdependence of insurgent decision 






to “tip” it by suppressing or compelling the behavior until reaching a self-
sustaining rate of activity.  A target, tip, target oscillation tactic may provide a 
practical way to operationalize these theoretical perspectives.   
1. Target—an activity to increase or decrease through amplification in 
presence, sanctions, and information operations 
2. Tip—the activity by suppressing or compelling (encouraging or 
discouraging) the behavior until a self-sustaining rate of increasing 
or decreasing activity is reached.  Exploit the residual effect. 
3. Target—a different activity or an activity in a different geographical 
area.  Re-target previous activities and areas as effects decay. 
B. A BULL’S EYE STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION  
IO can be used to achieve information-generated effects, and to enhance 
the impact of other military operations.  It may also be used, at times, to achieve 
information-generated effects as a stand-alone operation, as suggested in the 
study of anticipatory effects. 
A “Bull’s Eye resource and IO targeting strategy” could be used to achieve 
information-generated effects and to maximize the effectiveness IO in support of 
other military operations.  Johnson and Bowers originally proffered the Bull’s Eye 
strategy as an effective means for achieving diffusion effects in crime deterrent 
initiatives.42  The Bull’s Eye strategy is being adapted in this thesis to suggest a 
methodology for maximizing the effects of military operations through diffusion, 
and for using IO to achieve anticipatory and residual effects before and after a 
COIN initiative. 
Figure 7 shows how “the Bull’s Eye strategy” divides an operational area 
into concentric zones.  Physical and IO resources are then allocated separately 
into every other zone with the intent to achieve diffusion effects.  IO is also  
 
 
                                            
42 Shane D. Johnson and Kate Bowers, "Opportunity is in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role 




conducted prior to the onset and after the offset of the COIN initiative to keep the 




Figure 7.   The Bull’s Eye Resource and MISO Targeting Cycle43 
The Bull’s Eye resource and IO targeting strategy can be enhanced by 
disseminating messages across the entire operational area to promote the 
perception of elevated risk.  The disseminated messages should increase 
uncertainty by not giving specific information about exactly which areas are being 
targeted or when the operations are occurring.   
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The intent of this ambiguous messaging is that as the awareness of 
counterinsurgency operations increases, uncertainty as to the exact location and 
timing of these operations also increases, which results in an overestimation of 
the risks or effort involved in engaging in nefarious activities. This overestimation 
of risk leads to a reduction in insurgent activities as attacks and other violent acts 
are either deterred or delayed.  The Bull’s Eye targeting cycle will repeat itself as 
the residual effects begin to decay. 
Effects occurring prior to the onset of an operation should be considered 
in conjunction with effects transpiring in adjacent geographical areas, and the 
effects that happen after an operation has been completed.  In the same manner 
that anticipatory effects can occur prior to the onset of an operation, residual 
effects can ensue after an operation has been concluded.  
Smith et al. argue that anticipatory effects presume a counterinsurgency 
operation has already started, and residual effects lead an insurgent to assume 
that the operation is continuing. It is, therefore, possible to speculate on a 
standalone IO operation in which an insurgent’s false perceptions generate 
anticipatory effects, and the reduction in insurgent activity is sustained to achieve 
residual effects after the perceptional operation would have realistically ended.  
According to Smith et al., “this post (perceptional) crackdown period can be used 
to consolidate effects achieved.”44 
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